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AIRLINE INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS: WILL THE
CONTRACTS SHIFT YOUR RISKS?
STEPHEN C. KENNEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
U NITED STATES DOMESTIC air carriers provided
service to more than 338 million revenue passengers
between September 1, 1983 and August 31, 1984.' In
1983, these airlines also shipped 4.5 billion ton/miles of
freight throughout the country.' Although the safety rec-
* Partner, Fisher & Hurst, San Francisco, California; born Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, November 18, 1944; B.S., Ohio State University, 1966, J.D., Hastings
College of Law, University of California, 1972; Member, Moot Court Board,
1971-1972; Author: "Punitive Damages in Aviation Cases: Solving the Insurance
Coverage Dilemma", J. AIR L. & COM., Summer, 1983; "Deregulation of Airline
Baggage Tariffs: Will Insurers Get Caught Holding the Bag?" UNDERWRITER'S
REP., June, 1982; Member, Panel of Arbitrators, American Arbitration Associa-
tion, San Francisco Superior Court and United States District Court for Northern
District of California; Member, Bar Association of San Francisco; State Bar of Cal-
ifornia; American Bar Association [Litigation and Torts and Insurance Sections,
Aviation and Space Law Committee, Aviation Insurance Subcommittee]; Associa-
tion of Defense Counsel; Defense Research Institute; Lawyer-Pilots Bar Associa-
tion; Aviation Insurance Association; Ist Lt. U.S. Army, 1966-1968; Private pilot,
single engine, land and sea instrument rating.
I wish to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable efforts of Ken M. Markowitz,
Associate, Fisher & Hurst, San Francisco, California; B.A. Northwestern Univer-
sity, 1976; J.D., Golden Gate University, 1982; Member Bar Association of San
Francisco, California State Bar and American Bar Association, and Mark T. Han-
sen, Associate, Fisher & Hurst, San Francisco, California; B.S., University of Santa
Clara, 1981;J.D. Hastings College of Law, University of California, 1984; Member
Bar Association of San Francisco, California State Bar and American Bar Associa-
tion, who assisted in the research and preparation of this article. Mr. Markowitz
and Mr. Hansen have devoted many hours of their time to this project.
I Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics 2, 4, 43, 87, 143 (August
1984).
2 Figures provided by the Air Transport Association of America. Please note, a
ton/mile is a measure of one ton of cargo carried one mile.
613
614 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
ord of commercial aviation is exemplary, the sheer vol-
ume of air travel and cargo transit creates a foreseeability
that passengers or airline employees will be injured and
that consigned goods will be damaged, lost, or spoiled.
The relatively few incidents that ultimately result in claims
create enormous potential liability for the aviation indus-
try. In order to reduce their individual exposure to po-
tential liability claims, airlines and airport authorities
often incorporate indemnification provisions into their
agreements with one another. While formal actions for
indemnity are not routine within the aviation industry,
they appear to be increasing in number and often involve
substantial claims. Consequently, the indemnity concept
is a matter of considerable importance for airlines, airport
authorities, and aviation insurers.
In its simplest form, indemnity can be defined as a right
which inures to a person who has discharged a duty owed,
but, as between that person and another, the duty should
have been discharged by the other. For example, if a
party who is deemed technically liable for the injuries suf-
fered by another compensates the other party for his inju-
ries, the former may be entitled to recover the amount
paid from a culpable third party who is actually responsi-
ble for the injuries. Recovery may be based upon express
or implied contract, or founded in equity.4 Indemnity is a
concept distinct from contribution. The doctrine of con-
tribution distributes a loss among joint tortfeasors or obli-
gors by requiring each to pay his proportionate share,
while indemnity will, in many cases shift the entire loss
from one who has been compelled to pay to another, who
should rightfully bear the loss. 5
This article will examine various indemnity issues that
impact upon the aviation industry. It will first discuss in-
See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indemnity. Co. v. R. Herschel Mfg., 453 F.
Supp. 1375, 1379 (D.N.D. 1978).
4 See, e.g., Araujo v. Wood's Hole, 693 F.2d 1,2 (1st Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Milai v. Tradewind Industries, 556 F. Supp. 36, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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demnification concepts in general terms.6 The use of in-
demnity provisions in interline agreements between air
carriers7 and in airport user agreements' will then be ana-
lyzed. Additionally, the effect of indemnity upon aviation
insurers will be considered. 9 Finally, this article will dis-
cuss the importance of properly drafting airline indemnifi-
cation agreements and include proposed language for an
"ideal" indemnity clause.10 This analysis is not intended
to provide an exhaustive commentary on the theory of in-
demnity, however. Rather, its goal is to provide the
reader with an overview of the subject of indemnification
and its practical effect on the aviation industry."
II. INDEMNITY IN GENERAL
Indemnification, whether arising out of a contract or by
operation of law, allows air carriers and airport authorities
to shift some or all of their liability exposure to others.
Since air carriers and airport authorities, like individuals,
are generally risk averse, it is not surprising that they
would want to shift their own liability risks through the
use of indemnification concepts.' 2
Although indemnification in the aviation industry most
frequently arises in the context of an express agreement
between the interested parties, an express agreement is
1; Infra note 12-40 and accompanying text.
7 Infra notes 41-61 and accompanying text.
8 Infra notes 67-84 and accompanying text.
' Infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
,o Infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
For more detailed coverage of this topic, treatises such as American Jurispru-
dence and American Law Reports should be consulted.
2 Additionally, these aviation-oriented businesses may seek to shift their expo-
sure in order to avoid incurring additional insurance costs. For example, if one
airline (the seller) enters into an agreement to provide ground services to another
airline (the buyer), the seller's exposure to liability is likely to increase substan-
tially. If the seller's liability insurance will not cover this additional liability expo-
sure, the seller will undoubtedly wish to shift the risk and the corresponding
burden of purchasing additional insurance to the buyer, if it is to keep its own
insurance costs from rising. Given the current intense competition within the avi-
ation industry, minimizing operational costs (including insurance expenses) is an
important concern for all air carriers and airport authorities.
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generally not required to establish a right to indemnity.' 3
Courts in many jurisdictions have held that indemnity
may be justified if the evidence establishes an implied
contract.' 4 A right to indemnification may be implied, for
example, when a manufacturer provides a buyer with a
warranty on its product in the sales contract. If the buyer
subsequently incurs liability as a result of a defect in the
product, the ultimate loss may be shifted to the manufac-
turer under the principles of implied contractual indem-
nity. 5 Some courts have gone even further and held that
an indemnification right may arise through application of
equitable principles.' 6 For example, in the landmark case
of Herrero v. Atkinson,' 7 the California Court of Appeals de-
Is This was not always the case. Indemnity based upon an implied contract, see
infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, or equitable principles, see infra notes
16-19 and accompanying text, was unknown at common law. The common law
rule held that as between joint tortfeasors, there could be no right of contribution
or indemnity. This rule can be traced to the decision in Merryweather v. Nixen, 8
T.R. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). Thus, where two parties were held to be
jointly and severally liable for injuries suffered by the plaintiff and recovery was
effected from only one of the joint tortfeasors, the party making payment was
precluded from recouping all or part of its loss from the other joint tortfeasor.
This historical refusal to recognize a right to indemnity was premised upon the
idea that the courts were not open to assist wrongdoers in adjusting the burdens
of their misconduct. See id.
The harsh common law rule has given way to a tort system geared toward just
compensation. The theories underlying this system are no longer based upon the
assumption that negligence embodies a concept of misbehavior just short of crim-
inal or immoral conduct. Rather, courts have established new criteria so that a
person guilty of an active or affirmative act of negligence will not escape liability,
while another, whose fault is only technical or passive, is required to assume com-
plete liability. This important shift was noted over three decades ago by the court
in Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 98
N.E.2d 783 (1951).
14 See, e.g., In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz Off Coast of France on March 16,
1978, 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983); Palomba v.
City of East Detroit, 112 Mich. App. 209, 315 N.W.2d 898, 902 (1982); Hill V.
Sullivan Equipment Co., 86 Mich. App. 693, 173 N.W.2d 527 (1978); Card Con-
struction Co. v. Ledbetter, 16 Cal. App. 3d 472, 94 Cal. Rptr. 570, 574 (1971).
1.5 See, e.g., Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 541, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47,
51 (1984).
1c, See, e.g. American and Foreign Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 139 Ariz. 223,
677 P.2d 1331 (Ct. App. 1983); E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach,, 21
Cal. 3d 497, 510, 146 Cal. Rptr. 614, 622, 579 P.2d 505, 513 (1978); Griggs v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 103 Idaho 790, 654 P.2d 378, 380 (1982).
17 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
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clared: "that [t]he duty to indemnify may arise, and in-
demnity may be allowed in those fact situations where in
equity and good conscience the burden of judgment
should be shifted from the shoulders of the person seek-
ing indemnity to the one from whom indemnity is
sought. '1 8 It is important to note, however, that vague
"equity" standards, such as those enunciated in the Her-
rero decision, may pose considerable problems for parties
seeking to establish a right to indemnification based upon
equitable principles.' 9
One area of the aviation industry where express indem-
nity agreements are generally not used to shift the risk of
liability is in the relationship between air carriers and
manufacturers of aircraft and aircraft components. Most
purchase agreements between airlines and manufacturers
contain no express indemnity provisions running in favor
of either the buyer or the seller. Instead, manufacturers
frequently include a limited warranty in these agreements.
Should the product prove to be defective, then under the
terms of the warranty, the manufacturer is obligated only
to repair or replace the product.2 Consequently, if an
airline chooses to seek indemnification from the manufac-
turer for liability arising out of a product defect, it is usu-
ally necessary for the airline to rely upon theories of
implied contract or equitable principles. 2' However,
is 227 Cal. App. at 74, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
has adopted the following rule:
If two persons are liable in tort to a third person for the same harm
and one of them discharges the liability of both, he is entitled to
indemnity from the other if the other would be unjustly enriched at
his expense by the discharge of liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B(l) (1977)
19 Specifically, a party seeking to either assert or defend a claim for indemnifica-
tion under the Herrero standard faces a difficult task in evaluating its position, since
the result would depend upon a particular court's discretionary interpretation and
construction of the phrase, "in equity and good conscience."
20 See, e.g., Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance Co. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.,
617 F.2d 936, 939 (2d Cir.1980); Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 161
F. Supp. 452, 452-54 (D. Md. 1958).
21 For example, where an air carrier sustains liability for injury or death arising
out of an accident involving its aircarft or ground vehicles, it may attempt to es-
tablish an implied right to indemnity based upon alleged negligence or strict
6171986]
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manufacturers often incorporate provisions into their
purchase agreements requiring aircraft buyers to waive all
rights they may have against the manufacturer, except
those under the express terms of the warranty. 22 Accept-
ance of such a provision may preclude the buyer from es-
tablishing even an implied right to indemnity from the
manufacturer. 23
Today, at least in those jurisdictions which have em-
braced the concept of implied indemnity, express indem-
nification agreements are generally not essential to
establish a right to indemnity. There are, however, in-
stances where it may be preferable, if not necessary, to
have an express indemnity agreement. This is particularly
true in business arrangements involving aviation-related
activities. For example, a party may seek to be indemni-
fied for its own acts of negligence. As will be discussed
more fully below, interline agreements between air carri-
ers commonly focus on indemnification for a party's own
negligent acts.24
Although there exists some early authority to the con-
trary,25 the general rule today allows contracting parties
to agree to indemnification for the indemnitee's own acts
of negligence. 26 Jurisdictions differ, however, as to the
product liability claims against the manufacturer. See, e.g., Tokio Marine and Fire
Insurance Co. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d at 939 (holding no implied
right to indemnity based upon alleged negligence or strict product liability in that
instance).
22 See. e.g., id.
2. See id. A manufacturer's ability to insert such language into a particular
purchase agreement will depend largely upon the respective bargaining positions
of the buyer and the manufacturer. For example, an aircraft manufacturer might
be in a superior position to negotiate incorporation of such a waiver provision
into a purchase agreement involving the sale of a single aircraft. On the other
hand, a major carrier contemplating the purchase of an entire fleet might be able
to negotiate more desirable terms for itself.
24 See infra notes 45-49 and accompanying text. Indemnity in this context can-
not be based upon implied contract or equitable principles, since liability would
already rest with the actively culpable party. Instead, if a right to indemnity is to
be asserted, it must be based upon an express agreement. See supra notes 13-18
and accompanying text.
'. See, e.g., Johnson v. Richmond & D.R. Co., 86 Va. 975, 11 S.E. 829 (1890).
2 See, e.g., Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 59, 200
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type of contractual language that must be used in order to
create viable indemnity rights. The majority rule is that a
contract will not be construed to indemnify a party against
its own negligence unless such intention is expressed in
clear and unequivocal terms.27 Even among jurisdictions
following the majority rule, there is a split of authority on
how "clear and unequivocal" the language in the contract
must be in order to establish an enforceable right to in-
demnification. In some jurisdictions, explicit reference
must be made in the contract to the indemnitee's active
negligence if that is to be covered by the indemnity agree-
ment.2 In order to be enforceable in other jurisdictions,
the indemnity provision need only refer in some way to
the indemnitee's own negligence without differentiating
between active and passive negligence. 9  Curiously,
courts in a few jurisdictions purport to follow the majority
Cal. Rptr. 136, 146 (1984); Mid-America Sprayers, Inc. v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co.,
8 Kan. App. 2d 451, 660 P.2d 1380, 1387 (1983); George R. Hall, Inc. v. Superior
Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp. 985, 993 (N.D. Ga. 1982).
27 See, e.g., K/D Weatherbeaters, Inc. v. Gull Lake Industries, 698 F.2d 954, 956
(8th Cir. 1983); Widson v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 60,
200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 147 (1984); Ging v. Parker-Hunter, Inc., 544 F. Supp. 49, 54
(W.D. Pa. 1982). The reason underlying this rule is that contracts of indemnity
are usually intended to provide against the loss of liability of one party through
the operations of the other, or caused by physical conditions that are under the
control of the indemnifying party, rather than indemnified party. See, e.g., Walter
L. Couse & Co. v. Hardy Corp., 290 Ala. 134, 274 So. 2d 322, 328 (1973).
28 In California, for example, if the indemnity agreement only refers to the in-
demnitee's negligence generally and does not expressly mention its "active negli-
gence," the agreement will be deemed to extend only to the indemnitee's acts of
"passive negligence." See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Roy H. Cox Co., 103 Cal.
App. 3d 929, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (1980).
California courts have defined active negligence as personal participation in an
affirmative act of negligence, or connection with negligent acts or omissions by
knowledge or acquiescence, or failure to perform a duty which a party has agreed
to perform. See Rossmoor Sanitation, Inc. v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d 622, 628-30,
119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 453, 532 P.2d 97, 101 (1975). Passive negligence, on the
other hand, has been defined as nonfeasance, such as the failure to discover a
dangerous condition or to perform a duty imposed by law. Id.
21) See, e.g., George R. Hall Inc., v. Superior Trucking Co., 532 F. Supp 985, 993
(N.D. Ga. 1982); Weaver-Bailey Contractors, Inc. v. Fiske-Carter Construction
Co., 9 Ark. App. 192, 657 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Ct. App. 1983). In jurisdictions
adopting this approach, an agreement by one party to indemnify the other party
for the latter's own negligent acts would likely be enforceable against the
indemnitor.
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rule, but in fact allow indemnification where the intent to
indemnify a party for its own acts of negligence is not
clearly expressed in the agreement.3 0
Express indemnification language may also be advanta-
geous when injured employees bring third party lawsuits.
In most states, if an employee suffers injury or death dur-
ing the course and scope of his employment, worker's
compensation statutes provide the exclusive remedy for
the employee or his heirs against the employer.3 ' Thus,
o Cf, e.g., April v. Sovereign Construction Co., 55 N.Y.2d 626, 430 N.E.2d
1305, 446 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1981)(court held that subcontractor was required to in-
demnify general contractor in view of indemnity clause providing that subcontrac-
tor would assume responsibility and liability for injuries to any person, including
employees of subcontractor, arising out of any act or omission in connection with
any work under the subcontract). In Manson-Osberg v. State, 552 P.2d 654
(Alaska 1976), where the trial court had found the State of Alaska liable for the
death of an employee of a contractor, the Alaska Supreme Court held the contrac-
tor liable for indemnification of the state under the following contractual
language:
The contractor shall save harmless the government and all of its rep-
resentatives from all suits, actions, or claims of any character
brought on account of any injuries or damages sustained by any per-
son or property in consequence of any neglect in safeguarding the
work, or through the use of unacceptable materials in the construc-
tion of the improvement, or on account of any act or omission by the
said contractor or his employees, or from any claims or amounts
arising or recovered under the workmen's compensation laws or any
other law, by law, ordinance regulation, order, or decree. During
the prosecution of the work the contractor shall be responsible for
all damage or injury to any person or property of any character re-
sulting from any act, omission, neglect or misconduct in the manner
or method of executing said work satisfactorily, or due to the non-
execution of said work at any time, or due to defective work or
materials, and said responsibility shall continue until the date of final
inspection .. .
The state had assigned engineering inspectors to live at the sight of the construc-
tion project to ensure that the contractor built the bridge to specifications. The
plaintiffs decedent was killed in an accident when he fell off of an unrailed scaf-
fold. The trial court found that the death was caused by neglect in safeguarding
the work, that the state breached a duty to discover the failure to safeguard, but
that the contractor had to indemnify the state under the above quoted indemnity
clause.
One New York court held that a promise to indemnify a party for "all losses"
included losses resulting from the indemnitee's own negligence. Levine v. Shell
Oil Co., 28 N.Y.2d 205, 212, 269 N.E.2d 799, 803, 321 N.Y.S.2d 81, 86 (1971).
., For example, Section 3601 of the California Labor Code, provides in perti-
nent part: "Where the conditions of compensation ...set forth in [Labor Code]
Section 3600 concur, the right to recover such compensation . . . is . . .the ex-
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where an employee's injury or death is caused, at least in
part, by the employer's own negligence, the exclusivity of
the worker's compensation remedy precludes the injured
employee or his heirs from bringing a direct action
against the employer. The employee or his heirs can,
however, bring an action against other potentially culpa-
ble third parties.
When an injured employee pursues an action against a
third party tortfeasor, the latter may attempt, to seek in-
demnification from the former's employer, particularly if
the employer was substantially at fault for the underlying
injury or death. Requiring an employer to indemnify a
third party tortfeasor under these circumstances, how-
ever, would circumvent one of the goals of most worker's
compensation statutes-to limit the extent of the em-
ployer's liability based upon the purported exclusivity of
the worker's compensation remedy. Most jurisdictions
that have addressed this potential anomaly hold that in-
demnification is permissible where an employer has ex-
pressly contracted to indemnify the third party
tortfeasor These jurisdictions defer to the intent of the
parties and hold that express contractual indemnity is not
barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the state
worker's compensation statutes. 4
In the absence of an express employer/third party in-
demnity agreement, jurisdictions differ on if, and when,
an employer may be required to indemnify a third party
clusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against he employer..." CAL.
LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1983). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 1304 (1976); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1985).
-2 Under the prevailing view, unless a worker's compensation statute provides
to the contrary, an employee may bring an action against a third party not covered
by the Act. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see 81 AM.JuR. 2D Work-
men's Compensation §§ 65-72 (1976). See Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145 (1965).
.. See, e.g., Pocatello Industrial Park Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621
P.2d 399, 406 (1980); Whittle v. Pagani Bros. Construction Co., 383 Mass. 796,
422 N.E.2d 779, 781 (1981); Artesia v. Carter, 94 N.M. 311, 610 P.2d 198, 200
(Ct. App. 1980); Glass v. Stahl Specialty Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d 948, 951
(1982).
.4 See cases cited supra note 33.
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tortfeasor for an employee's injury or death.3 5 Accord-
ingly, a third party wanting assurance of indemnity in this
situation should enter into an express indemnity agree-
ment with the employer. If this is not done, the third
party's right to indemnity becomes uncertain, and may
depend largely upon criteria beyond the control of either
party. Such criteria include the facts of the particular case
and the characteristics of the courts where the claim is
adjudicated.
Similarly, parties who want their indemnity arrange-
ment to be governed by their choice of law will find an
express indemnity agreement preferrable. Generally, in
the absence of an express indemnity agreement, the law
of the place having the most significant relationship to the
transaction or occurrence determines a tortfeasor's right
to indemnity. 6 Where an express contract of indemnity
exists, however, the parties may specify in the agreement
35 Although at least one jurisdiction has permitted indemnity on the basis of
common law or equitable principles (see Carlson v. Smogard, 298 Minn. 362, 215
N.W.2d 615 (1974)), many courts have refused to allow such recoveries. See, e.g.,
Paur v. Crookston Marine, Inc., 93 F.R.D. 450, 466 (D.N.D. 1979); Cordier v.
Stetson Ross, Inc., 184 Mont. 502, 604 P.2d 86, 90 (1979); Glass v. Stahl Specialty
Co., 97 Wash. 2d 880, 652 P.2d 948, 951 (1982). Jurisdictions are divided on
whether the exclusivity of the worker's compensation remedy precludes indemnity
based upon theories of "active-passive negligence" or vicarious liability. For ex-
amples of cases which have not allowed indemnity on this basis, see Redwing
Carriers, Inc. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 356 So. 2d 1203, 1204 (Ala.
1978); Rucker Co. v. M & P Drilling Co., 653 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Okla. 1982);. For
examples of cases allowing indemnity in this instance, see Dulin v. Circle F. Indus-
tries, Inc., 558 F.2d 456, 464 (8th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Shipman, 89 II1. App. 3d
162, 411 N.E.2d 569 (1980).
Finally, many jurisdictions permit a third party to obtain indemnification from
an employer based upon an implied contract theory. See, e.g., Farrall v. Armstrong
Cork Co., 457 A.2d 763, 766 (Del. Super. Ct. 1983); Pocatello Industrial Park Co.
v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980); Harter Concrete
Products, Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526 (Okla. 1979). There are certain jurisdic-
tions, however, which decline to follow this rule. See, e.g., Alameda Tank Co. v.
Starkist Foods, Inc., 103 Cal. App. 3d 428, 162 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (1980); Man-
son-Osberg Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 654, 658 (Alaska 1976). In these jurisdictions,
the only way for a third party to obtain indemnification from an employer is
through an express indemnity agreement.
-1; See, e.g., Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 472
F. Supp. 385, 391 (N.D. Il1. 1979); Federated Mutual Ins. Co. v. Gray, 475 F.
Supp. 679 (E.D. Mo. 1979).
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which state's law will govern the validity, operation, and
effect of the contract.3 7 Knowing at the outset which law
will govern a party's indemnity rights can vitiate disagree-
ments and serve to facilitate settlement of indemnity dis-
putes which might otherwise prove to be quite costly.
An express indemnity agreement may also be prefera-
ble, if not necessary, when attempting to determine the
time at which indemnity rights become enforceable.
Upon execution of an express indemnity agreement, the
parties can choose to delineate specifically the time at
which the right to indemnification will vest. The right to
assert a claim for indemnity may vest when the indemni-
tee's liability is established, when a claim for damages has
been made, or after the indemnitee has made payment or
otherwise suffered actual loss or damage.3 8 Where no ex-
press provision exists, however, the issue could poten-
tially become the focus of unpredictable and expensive
litigation.
One final matter to consider within the ambit of general
indemnification issues involves attorney fees. Although
analyses of indemnity claims frequently focus upon liabil-
ity and damages issues, a good deal of consideration may
37 See, e.g., Blalock v. Perfect Subscription Co., 458 F. Supp. 123, 126 (S.D. Ala.
1978); Steinke v. Boeing Co., 525 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Mont. 1981); Aluminum
Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 56 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
It, Although express indemnity provisions frequently and confusingly refer to a
variety of different points at which the right to indemnify will become enforceable,
a right to indemnity generally will vest either when the indemnitee's liability is
established which will be true where the promise is to indemnify against liability
or claims for damages, (See, e.g., Christy v. Menasha Corp., 297 Minn. 334, 211
N.W.2d 773 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 281 N.W.2d 848 (1979)), or when the
indemnitee has made payment or otherwise suffered actual loss or damage as in
the case where the agreement is for indemnification against loss or damage. See,
e.g., Daily Express, Inc. v. Northern Neck Transfer Co., 490 F. Supp. 1304, 1307
(M.D. Pa. 1980).
Thus, for example, if Company A expressly promises to indemnify Company B
"against all loss or damage" which the latter may suffer as a result of its contract
with the former, Company B may not enforce its right to indemnification immedi-
ately upon receipt of a claim from an injured third party; instead, Company B
must claim and actually sustain an actual loss due to judgment or settlement
before it may properly seek indemnity from Company A. See Daily Express, Inc.,
490 F. Supp. at 1307.
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need to be given to reimbursement of attorney fees. A
party defending against a third-party may attempt to seek
indemnification from another, not only for the liability it
has incurred, but also for the costs associated with the de-
fense of the third-party action. Given the high cost of liti-
gation today, it is not difficult to imagine instances where
attorney fees and expenses can equal or exceed the
amount of damages recovered by the third-party. Conse-
quently, recovery of attorney fees incurred in the defense
of a claim may be as important as the claim for indemnity
itself.
As a general rule, unless an indemnity agreement pro-
vides to the contrary, an indemnitee, as part of his dam-
ages, is entitled to recover from the indemnitor
reasonable attorney fees incurred in defending the third-
party claim.3 9 It is important to distinguish between attor-
ney fees incurred in defending against third-party claims
and those incurred in establishing the right to indemnifi-
cation. The former are usually recoverable. In the ab-
sence of an express agreement, however, attorney fees
incurred in an attempt to establish indemnity rights are
generally not recoverable.40
The use of indemnity agreements in this context can fa-
cilitate resolution of disputes which might arise between
parties subsequent to the establishment of their relation-
39 Seee.g., DeWitt v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1452 (9th Cir.
1983); Southern Ry. Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp,. 220 Va. 291, 257 S.E.2d
841, 844 (1979). At least one jurisdiction has refused to award attorney fees in
the absence of an express agreement therefor. See United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co. v. Davis Mechanical Contractors, 15 N.C. App. 127, 189 S.E.2d 553,
554 (1972). However, in many jurisdictions, attorney fees can be recovered where
the right to indemnity arises out of an express contract, or by operation of law.
See, e.g., Rabon v. Automatic Fasteners, Inc., 672 F.2d 1231, 1239 (5th Cir. 1982);
Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. M.V. Vishva Shobha, 494 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
41 See, e.g. Dillingham Shipyard v. Associated Insulation Co., 649 F.2d 1322,
1328 (9th Cir. 1981);Jones v. Storm Construction Co., 84 Wash. 2d 518, 527 P.2d
1115, 1119 (1974). Notwithstanding the prevailing rule, some jurisdictions have
allowed recovery for attorney fees incurred in establishing a right to indemnifica-
tion. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Western Pacific R.R. Co., 719 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.
1983).
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ship. By reducing their intentions to writing, the parties
can establish whether the indemnity agreement will ex-
tend to recovery of attorney fees associated with the de-
fense of third-party claims. The agreement can also
indicate whether a party can recover any attorney fees in-
curred in its pursuit of establishing a right to
indemnification.
III. INDEMNITY BETWEEN AIRLINES
A. Generally
Air carriers are among the most visible business entities
in the aviation industry. This visibility, based upon con-
tinuous public contact, exposes airlines to substantial lia-
bility risks arising from their daily business operations. It
is, therefore, not surprising that indemnity can be particu-
larly important when carriers engage in business dealings
with one another. For airlines, the topic of indemnity
most frequently arises in the context of individual service
agreements between carriers, commonly known as inter-
line agreements. 4'
Interline agreements are commonly used when one car-
rier (the buyer) wants to begin or expand service at a loca-
tion where another carrier (the seller) has already
established a fixed base of operations. 42 Through an in-
41 There are surprisingly few reported cases dealing with air carrier interline
agreements and the indemnity provisions therein. Consequently, much of the
analysis in this section will be based upon the discussion in the preceding section
concerning indemnity in general. For examples of decisions involving interpreta-
tion of air carrier interline agreements and the indemnity provisions contained in
those agreements, see Schachnovsky v. Trans World Airlines, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH)
18,351 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) and Northwest Airlines v. Alaska Airlines, 12 Av.
Cas (CCH) 17,584, 17,585 (D. Alaska 1972).
42 The terms "Seller" and "Buyer" are commonly used in interline agreements
between airlines. In the interest of consistency and confidentiality, the terms
"seller" and "buyer" are incorporated into this article rather than specific names
of airlines.
Ordinarily, interline agreements are not public record, but rather are private
contracts between various airlines. In order to avoid violating the sanctity of
these confidential agreements, this article will refer only in general terms to these
agreements, and will omit the names of the parties and airports involved where
appropriate. A sampling of indemnity provisions from airport user agreements
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terline contract, the seller agrees to provide the buyer
with particular support services, which the buyer would
otherwise have to provide for itself. Such agreements can
benefit both carriers. The buyer, on the one hand, mini-
mizes its expenditures for capital and overhead at the new
station. It can avoid substantial manpower expenses and
potential staffing problems by contracting with the seller
for manpower and facility services. The seller, on the
other hand, earns additional revenue and makes more ef-
ficient use of its existing resources. Individual service
agreeements can extend to a variety of different services,
including de-icing, non-routine maintenance, sanitary dis-
posal, ground handling, catering, and subleases of airport
space and equipment.
The focal point of interline agreements, at the forma-
tion stage, is usually the price which the seller will receive
for its services. Parties frequently give little attention at
the bargaining stage of their agreement to "peripheral"
terms such as provisions pertaining to indemnification. In
fact, express indemnity provisions in many agreements
are included as afterthoughts, or simply because the
seller's standard form happens to contain such a clause.43
Generally, indemnification issues44 do not arise until one
will be included in the appendix, however, since these pacts are a matter of public
record.
It should also be noted that this article will not discuss the interline agreement
which exists between many air carriers concerning the ability to ticket passengers
and ship cargo on other participating carriers.
43 For example, the standard form used by one airline provides in part:
Customer hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless [Seller]
• . . from and against any and all claims (including, but not limited
to, attorneys' fees, costs and expenses incident thereto) for loss of or
damage to property, freight, or for death of, or injury to, any per-
sons whomsoever, arising out of or connected with this Agreement
and/or the performance, or failure to perform services hereunder,
unless such claims, loss, damage, death or injury results from the
gross negligence of [Seller], its officers, agents or employees.
This agreement has been referred to in only the broadest of terms in order to
preserve its confidential nature. For another example of an interline indemnity
provision, see Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH)
17,584 (D. Alaska 1972).
- For a discussion of possible issues that may arise, see iifra notes 46-66 and
accompanying text.
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party makes a claim for indemnity under the agreement.
At that point, the precise language of the indemnity provi-
sion can become very important, for it may well determine
who will bear the ultimate liability exposure charged in-
itally to the party seeking indemnity.
B. Indemnity Provisions in Interline Agreements
Express indemnity provisions are contained in almost
all indiviual ground service contracts entered into be-
tween air carriers. Such clauses generally attempt to pro-
vide the seller with a right to indemnity from the buyer for
liability arising out of the provision of service under the
agreement.4 5 The theoretical premise for such indemnity
is the idea that the seller is only shifting to the buyer the
risk of liability which the buyer would otherwise bear if it
were to provide its own services. One possible basis for
this premise is a belief that the seller's employees will per-
form satisfactorily, as would the buyer's.
The specific language used in interline agreement in-
demnity clauses can vary significantly, depending upon
the parties to the contract, the services to be provided,
and even the airport involved. Essentially, however, these
clauses share the same tone: the buyer agrees to indem-
nify the seller for any loss or liability which might arise
out of the seller's provision of service under the agree-
ment, except those claims, losses, or liabilities which arise
out of the seller's own culpable conduct.4 6
At first blush, most interline indemnity clauses appear
to conclusively establish the seller's right to indemnity
from the buyer. On closer examination, it is apparent that
the language in these provisions is fraught with problems
that could hinder and possibly defeat any claim for indem-
nity asserted under the agreement. For example, under
the terms of an agreement between two prominent United
States carriers, wherein the seller agreed to provide emer-
4 See, e.g., supra note 43.
4,; Such culpable conduct is frequently characterized in indemnity clause lan-
guage as "gross negligence" or "wilful misconduct." See supra notes 38-43.
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gency aircraft maintenance to the buyer at a large south-
west airport, the indemnity clause provides in part:
Customer hereby agrees to indemnify and save harmless
[seller], its officers, agents, and employees from and
against any and all claims for loss of, or damages to prop-
erty, freight or cargo, or for the death of, or injury to, any
persons whomsoever, arising out of or connected with this
Agreement and/or the performance, or failure to perform
services hereunder, unless such claims, loss, damage,
death or injury results from the gross negligence or willful
misconduct of [seller], its officers, agents or employees.4 7
A hypothetical may serve to illustrate the point. Assume
that pursuant to this indemnity agreement, the seller per-
forms repairs on the engines of one buyer's aircraft. After
the repairs are completed, the aircraft departs with a full
passenger load and crashes due to alleged engine mal-
function. Assume further that the alleged engine failure is
ultimately attributed to improper repairs by the seller.
Will the seller be able to obtain indemnity from the buyer,
under the above clause, for the substantial liability the
seller is likely to incur as a result of the accident? The
answer is not at all clear. Although the indemnity provi-
sion purports to cover all of the seller's liability, except
for that arising out of the seller's "gross negligence," the
buyer is likely to argue, given the magnitude of the liabil-
ity exposure, that the seller's conduct constituted "gross
negligence." The ambiguity inherent in the term "gross
negligence ' 48 would almost certainly preclude early set-
41 See, supra note 42.
4" "Gross negligence" is not susceptible of a precise definition. Jurisdictions
have defined the term in various ways. For example, in the District of Columbia,
gross negligence implies an "extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care." See Wager v. Pro, 603 F.2d 1005, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (citing W.PROSSER,
LAW OF TORTS § 8 (1971)). In Kentucky, the term is defined as the "absence of
slight cares." McTavish v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 485 F.2d 510 (6th Cir. 1972)
(applying Kentucky law). In Oregon, gross negligence is characterized as "con-
scious indifference to or reckless disregard of the rights of others." Ryan v. Foster
& Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460, 464 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Oregon law). In
South Carolina, gross negligence has been defined in a variety of ways, including
"the intentional, conscious failure to do a thing that is encumbent [sic] upon one
to do, or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do." Pilot Indus-
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tlement of the seller's claim, with the result that the par-
ties would be forced to resolve the dispute thorugh
expensive and time-consuming litigation. Ironically, the
outcome of the trial would likely turn on a particular
court's interpretation of the unusually imprecise legal
term, "gross negligence.' "4
A second example of the latent problems which can
arise from the language in interline indemnity agreements
is illustrated by a contract between two major U.S. carri-
ers wherein the seller agreed to provide ground services
and sanitary disposal to the buyer at a relatively small East
Coast airport. The indemnity provision in that contract
provides:
[Buyer] agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless
[seller], its directors, officers, employees, agents and rep-
resentatives from and against all claims, liability, loss or
expense, including legal fees and court costs, arising out
of or in connection with this agreement including, but not
limited to, claims of employees of [buyer], claims arising
out of injury, death or property damage (except property
of [seller]), direct and/or consequential, to any person
(except employees of [seller]) or entity, unless caused by
the gross negligence or willful misconduct of [seller].5
Apart from the difficulty of interpreting such imprecise
terms as "gross negligence" and "willful misconduct," the
above quoted clause is also arguably unclear as to when
the seller's right to indemnity becomes enforceable.
The clause speaks of indemnity for "all claims, liability,
loss or expense." As noted above, however, the right to
indemnity will vest at different times, depending upon
tries v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telelegraph Co., 495 F.Supp. 356, 362
(D.S.C. 1979) (applying South Carolina law.)
In addition, some jurisdictions, such as Kansas, do not even recognize degrees
of negligence, such as gross negligence. See, e.g., Holman v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone Co., 358 F. Supp. 727, 728 n.l (D. Kan. 1973) (applying Kansas law).
It should be noted that Kansas, however, does differentiate between ordinary neg-
ligence and reckless, wanton, or willful misconduct. Id.
49 See supra note 48.
-', See supra note 42.
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whether it pertains to exposure or actual loss. 5' If the
seller faced exposure to substantial liability arising out of
its provision of services to the buyer under the above
agreement, the seller would undoubtedly want the buyer
to indemnify it as soon as liability was established and
before seller had made any payment. The buyer, how-
ever, would probably wish to retain its indemnification re-
serve for as long as possible. Accordingly, the buyer will
likely argue that its responsibility to indemnify the seller
did not arise until the seller has sustained an actual out-
of-pocket loss. 52 Again, ambiguity in the terms of the in-
demnity provision could preclude or hinder settlement of
the seller's claim. If the parties opted to litigate, a court
might well find that the seller could not enforce its indem-
nity rights under the agreement until after it had sus-
tained actual loss, given that "loss" is expressly
mentioned in the agreement. The court could conceiva-
bly construe the indemnity terms in that manner, based
upon the fact that the agreement was probably drafted by
the seller, the party seeking indemnity.53
In addition to indemnity clauses, interline contracts
generally contain provisions in which the buyer agrees to
obtain and maintain at its expense a specified amount of
liability insurance covering the services to be provided by
the seller under the agreement. Frequently, the buyer
must name the seller as an additional insured under its
liability policy. For example, the insurance provision in
one carrier's interline agreement provides in part:
Policies of aircraft and comprehensive general liability in-
surance [shall be procured by Buyer and] shall be en-
dorsed to cover the indemnity and hold harmless
obligations of [Buyer] to [Seller] hereunder and shall be
51 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
5 Id.
. As a general rule, express indemnity agreements, when ambiguous, are con-
strued in favor of the indemnitor or strictly against the indemnitee, especially
when the latter is the drafter of the instrument. See, e.g., Marathon Steel Co. v.
Tilley Steel, Inc., 66 Cal. App. 3d 413, 416, 136 Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1977); Robert-
son v. Swindell-Dressler Co., 82 Mich App. 382, 267 N.W.2d 131, 140 (1978) .
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further endorsed to name [Seller] as an additional
insured. 4
Through such provisions, sellers are able to shift the cost
of insurance for services provided to the buyers. 5 These
additional insurance provisions have special implications
for aviation insurers, as will be discussed more fully
below.56
C. Practical Problems Associated with Interline Agreements
There are a number of practical problems which buyers
and sellers may experience after they execute interline in-
demnity agreements. Some of these problems are inter-
nal to the airlines, others are external. The buyer may
face two significant internal problems. First, and notwith-
standing the possible rationale for indemnification, the
seller's personnel may not function as effectively in pro-
viding service under the agreement as would the buyer's
employees due to varying quality control and perform-
ance standards within the aviation industry. Thus, the
buyer may be exposing itself to greater risk by entering
into the interline agreement than it would ordinarily haz-
ard if it utilized its own more qualified manpower re-
sources. Secondly, if the buyer must obtain additional
insurance under the terms of the agreement, its insurance
costs may increase. Moreover, even if current premiums
are not affected, all additional claims will undoubtedly be
considered by the insurer in connection with the buyer's
long-term risk experience.
An internal concern peculiar to the seller involves its
increased potential exposure to liability under the terms
of the interline agreement. While the seller will attempt
to shift its increased exposure to the buyer through an in-
demnity provision, if the indemnity provision is held to be
-4 See generally supra note 42 (stating the confidential nature of actual interline
agreements).
m, The importance of shifting the cost of insurance for services provided is dis-
cussed supra at note 12 and accompanying text.
.- See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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unenforceable, the seller or its insurer may be required to
bear the cost of a damage or injury claim that would not
have arisen had the seller not agreed to provide services
to the buyer. To illustrate this point, assume that two car-
riers enter into an interline agreement wherein the seller
agrees to provide ramp service for the buyer and the
buyer agrees to indemnify the seller against liability aris-
ing from the agreement, including the liability resulting
from the seller's own acts of negligence. Assume further
that in its provision of ramp service to the buyer, the
seller injures an employee of the buyer, who subsequently
prosecutes a successful action against the seller. If the
seller is unable to enforce its right to indemnification
from the buyer, it will be forced to compensate the em-
ployee for his injuries, even though the seller probably
would never have incurred such liability if it had not en-
tered into the interline agreement with the buyer.
Interline indemnity agreements may also create a po-
tentially controversial issue for the buyer on the external
level. For example, if the seller negotiates a choice of law
provision into the contract, the buyer may face enforce-
ment or interpretation of the agreement under state laws
that are favorable to the seller. 57 The seller may have to
consider practical problems on the external level for simi-
lar reasons. The buyer might attempt to defeat a seller's
claim for indemnification if the indemnity provision in the
agreement is not drafted with sufficient specificity to com-
ply with the requirements of a particular jurisdiction.58 A
particular indemnity provision might even withstand a
legal challenge in one jurisdiction, yet fail a similar test in
another forum. 59 For example, assume that two airlines
enter into an interline catering agreement wherein the
buyer agrees to indemnify the seller for any liability the
latter incurs arising out of the agreement, including "lia-
bility resulting from the seller's own negligence." As-
.17 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
- See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
.- Id.
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sume further that on one occasion, the seller, while
delivering meals to the buyer's aircraft, negligently drives
its truck into one of the buyer's employees, causing seri-
ous injury to the employee. In a suit to obtain indemnity
from the buyer for liability arising from this accident, the
seller would likely succeed in a jurisdiction such as Arkan-
sas, where general reference in an indemnity agreement
to the seller's own negligence is sufficient to create a right
of indemnification in the seller for its own "active nege-
ligence. '"60 In California, however, the seller would prob-
ably be precluded from obtaining indemnity in this
instance, since the indemnification agreement does not
expressly mention the seller's "active negligence. '"61
Since many air carriers operate on a nationwide basis and
most operate on a multi-state basis, contracts for indemni-
fication should be drafted with the goal of enforceability
in every jurisdiction.
D. Relationship of Interline Indemnity Contracts to Insurance
Aviation insurers may ultimately bear the burden of any
increase in liability arising out of a seller's performance
under an interline agreement. Therefore, the indemnifi-
cation and insurance provisions in such agreements as-
sume obvious importance. Problems may arise for the
insurers of both the buyer and seller when an interline
agreement includes an indemnification clause.
One major concern of the buyer's insurer is, of course,
whether the interline agreement will create an enforcea-
ble claim for indemnification against the buyer if the seller
becomes liable to another in performing under the agree-
ment. If the agreement has created a right to indemnity
in the seller, the buyer may attempt to look to its own in-
surer for coverage and reimbursement. It may be possi-
ble for the buyer's insurer to avoid the buyer's claim, on
the ground that the buyer failed to name the seller as an
(' See supra note 29.
oi See supra note 28.
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additional insured. However, this argument may be
closed to the insurer if it has granted the buyer broad
powers to accept contractual liability under its insurance
policy. 62 In addition, the insurer may decide to cover the
buyer's liability in order to maintain good business rela-
tions with the buyer; this is a particularly important con-
sideration for insurers in light of the high level of
competition among insurers in the aviation market.
If the buyer's insurer refuses indemnification, addi-
tional litigation involving coverage issues may result. For
example, assume that in an interline agreement, the buyer
has promised to indemnify the seller for liability that the
seller incurs arising out of the agreement. While furnish-
ing services pursuant to the terms of the agreement, the
seller incurs liability for which it is entitled to be indemni-
fied, and subsequently demands indemnification from the
buyer. The buyer, in turn, requests its liability insurer to
provide coverage for the loss. If the buyer's insurer re-
fuses, claiming that the buyer failed to name the seller as
an additional insured, the buyer may be forced to bring an
action against its insurer to establish who must bear the
liability incurred by the seller. In order to preserve stable
business relations between air carriers and their insurers,
such a situation should be avoided.
Another problem for the buyer's insurer arises from the
fact that in many interline indemnity agreements, the
buyer agrees to require its insurer to waive any rights of
subrogation the insurer might have against the seller for
any loss or damage resulting from the seller's perform-
ance under the agreement. In this situation, if the seller's
right to indemnity is upheld, and the buyer's insurance
policy covers the incurred liability, the buyer's insurer be-
comes the entity ultimately burdened by the claim. For
'6 Certain air carriers are authorized by their insurers to enter into agreements
in this manner. These carriers are not required to obtain formal permission or
endorsement from their insurers in order to implement coverage for the newly
created contractual liability. Compensation may be required in some instances,
however, and if the insurer is not immediately notified, the compensation for the
additional coverage may be obtained by way of year-end audit procedures.
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example, assume that the buyer has promised to indem-
nify the seller for liability arising out of an interline in-
demnity agreement for ground handling. In addition, the
buyer has agreed to require its insurer to waive any rights
of subrogation the insurer might have against the seller
based upon the agreement. Assume further that the
seller, through its own negligence, injures one of the
buyer's passengers while providing the ground handling
service, and that such liability is covered by the indemnity
agreement. If the buyer has named the seller as an addi-
tional insured under its policy, it is likely that the buyer's
insurer will be obligated to compensate the injured pas-
senger for the injuries sustained as a result of the seller's
negligence. It is also probable that the buyer's insurer
will be precluded from recovering against the seller, since
the insurer's subrogation rights against the seller were ex-
pressly waived in the interline agreement.
One problem for the seller's insurer involves the
buyer's obligation to purchase additional insurance cover-
ing the seller's performance under the agreement or nam-
ing the seller as an additional insured in its present
policy. 63 At least one jurisdiction has held that where a
seller's claim for indemnification from the buyer is unen-
forceable, and the buyer has failed to obtain insurance
naming the seller as an additional insured, the seller or its
insurer must bear the liability exposure and may only re-
cover from the buyer those damages resulting from the
latter's contract.64 In such a situation, the seller's insurer
would face exposure up to the limits of the seller's policy.
For example, assume that in providing ramp service
under an interline agreement, the seller, through its own
active negligence, injures one of the buyer's employees.
Assume further that the indemnity provision in that
agreement does not extend to the seller's active negli-
gence, and that the buyer has breached its contractual ob-
See text accompanying note 54 supra.
See Hollywood Turf Club v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 58 Cal. App. 3d 580,
130 Cal. Rptr. 81 (1976).
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ligation to name the seller as an additional insured under
its liability policy. If the injured employee obtains ajudg-
ment against the seller, the seller's insurer would be obli-
gated to pay the entire award as long as the amount was
within the seller's policy limits. The seller's insurer would
have no direct cause of action against the buyer for its
breach, since the insurer had previously agreed to defend
and indemnify such losses, and was, therefore, technically
not damaged by the breach.
E. What Effect Would the Elimination of Indemnity Contracts
Have Upon Airline Operations?
Although indemnification clauses are common in inter-
line agreements, it is unlikely that airline operations, as a
whole, would be significantly affected by the elimination
of such provisions. The elimination of indemnity agree-
ments would, however, promote an increase in the cost of
services provided under interline agreements in many
instances.
In the absence of express indemnity provisions, it is
reasonable to assume that a seller entering into an inter-
line agreement would seek to rely upon implied indem-
nity, where possible, to shift its increased exposure risk to
the buyer. For example, where a third party is injured as a
result of the seller's passive negligence and the buyer's
active negligence, the seller would probably be successful
in its attempts to obtain indemnity from the buyer, based
upon an implied indemnity theory.6 5 In this situation, the
elimination of express indemnity agreements would have
little bearing upon the cost of services provided under the
interline agreement.
Where the seller could not rely upon implied indemnity
to insulate itself from the risk, however, it is likely that the
cost of services would increase. The seller could not avail
itself of implied indemnity for liability it might incur as a
1. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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result of its own negligence.6 6 Consequently, the seller
would probably purchase additional insurance to cover
this aspect of its operations under the agreement. It is
likely that the seller would then pass the cost of this insur-
ance on to the buyer or future buyers in the form of a
higher price for its services.
While cost may be a significant factor in a carrier's deci-
sion to purchase service from another carrier, it is not the
only criterion. A carrier's desire to establish a foothold in
a particular market, for example, might logically support a
decision to enter into an interline agreement with another
carrier, even though the price of the seller's services
might exceed that which would otherwise prevail if the
agreement contained an indemnity provision. In other
words, marketing considerations can easily relegate con-
tractual indemnity provisions to a position of secondary
importance.
IV. INDEMNITY CLAUSES IN AIRPORT USER AGREEMENTS
As a general rule, in the absence of a statute providing
otherwise, municipalities and counties are liable for negli-
gent operation of public airports on the ground that own-
ership and operation of airports are proprietary rather
than governmental functions.67 Consequently, given the
large volume of air traffic which domestic airports handle
each year, indemnity is a matter of considerable concern
for airport authorities.
Before an air carrier may provide service to a particular
location, it must first secure the permission of the local
airport authority.68 Usually this is done by entering into a
"user agreement" with that authority. Such agreements
generally set forth the terms and conditions governing the
carrier's operating rights at the airport. They frequently
include clauses requiring the airline to purchase insurance
See supra note 24.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Jackson Mun. Airport Authority, 419 So.2d 1010, 1012
(Miss. 1982).
- See generally 2 S. SPIESER & C. KRAUSE, AVIATION TORT LAW, Ch. 21 (1979).
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and to indemnify the airport authority for liability it might
incur during the course of its operations.69
The specific language found in the indemnity provi-
sions of airport user agreements, like the language in ex-
isting interline agreements, varies considerably
depending upon the airport authority involved. 70 Cur-
rently, at least three different types of indemnity provi-
sions exist in airport user agreements.7' In the first type
(Type I), the airline agrees to indemnify and defend the
airport authority from all claims and actions arising out of
the carrier's use of the airport, excepting any liability for
injury or damage occasioned by the negligence of the air-
port authority itself.72
The second type of indemnification provision (Type II)
is essentially an expansion of Type I. It usually contains
language similar to Type I insofar as the carrier's duty to
indemnify the airport authority is concerned, but with a
further proviso that the airport authority agrees to indem-
nify the carrier for possible liability which the carrier may
incur arising out of the negligent acts or omissions of the
airport authority.7"
The third type of indemnity clause (Type III) com-
monly found in airport user agreements provides that the
air carrier will indemnify and defend the airport authority
from all claims, liability and judgments arising in any
manner from the carrier's operations at the airport. 4 A
Type III clause contains no exclusion for liability resulting
1; For examples of indemnity provisions found in airport user agreements, see
Appendix. See also Verral v. Port Authority, 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,327 (N.Y.
1980); Rogers v. Western Airlines, 15 Av. Cas (CCH) 17,831, 17,833 (Mont.
1979); North Central Airlines v. City of Aberdeen, 9 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,350,
18,351 (8th Cir. 1966).
-, See supra note 69 and the cases cited therein for examples of the variety of
provisions used in these agreements.
7, See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
72 This type of indemnity provision has been used by airport authorities in
Boise, Detroit, Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland, Sacramento, San Antonio, San Di-
ego, and San Francisco. See Appendix.
7-4 Indemnity provisions to this effect have been employed by airport authorities
in Dallas-Ft. Worth, Milwaukee, and San Jose. See Appendix.
74 An indemnity provision of this type has been used by the airport authority in
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from the negligence of the airport authority.7 5
The ambiguities inherent in the language of interline
indemnity agreements are also common in the indemnity
provisions of airport user agreements. For example, the
indemnity provision in the airport user agreement utilized
by the Modesto, California airport provides:
Operator [airline] shall indemnify, defend and hold harm-
less Lessor [airport authority], its officers, agents and em-
ployees from and against any and all claims, demands,
liabilities, suits, judgments, costs and expenses asserted by
any person or persons, including officers, agents or em-
ployees of Lessor or Operator, arising in any way from
Operator's operations hereunder or as the result of any-
thing claimed to be done or omitted to be done by Opera-
tor hereunder.7 6
As in the case of interline indemnity provisions examined
earlier, this clause, on first reading, appears to conclu-
sively create a right to indemnity from the carrier in the
airport authority. Once again, however, a closer inspec-
tion of the terms of this provision reveals problems with
the language that could hamper or even preclude the air-
port authority from enforcing its right to indemnity
against the carrier.
For instance, assume for illustrative purposes only that
during a takeoff attempt, one of the carrier's aircraft is
forced off the runway at the Modesto Airport. Assume
further that the aircraft left the runway in part because of
pilot negligence, but in greater part because of the airport
authority's negligent maintenance of the runway. If an ac-
tion against the airport authority by injured airline pas-
sengers resulted in a judgment for damages against the
airport authority, the airport authority would not likely
prevail in an attempt to obtain indemnification from the
carrier under the terms of the above-quoted indemnity
Modesto, California. The indemnity provision in the Modesto Airport user agree-
ment is set forth in the text accompanying note 76, if'a.
75 See id.
7,; For specific examples of other indemnity provisions, see Appendix.
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provision. The carrier could point to the fact that noth-
ing in the agreement specifically mentions indemnifica-
tion for negligence by the airport authority. Arguably, the
language used is vague and ambiguous. In additon, the
carrier might argue that the indemnity provision should
not be enforced because it constitutes an adhesion con-
tract.77 Assuming that the airport authority drafted the
clause, and in light of its arguably superior bargaining po-
sition, these considerations might well persuade a court to
reject the airport authority's claim for indemnification,
thus forcing the airport authority to bear all liability for
the injured passengers' claims.78
It is also important to note that the indemnity clause in
the Modesto user agreement makes no specific reference
to the "active negligence" of the airport authority.
Under California law, an indemnitee may not obtain in-
demnification for its own "active negligence" unless the
indemnity agreement contains an express provision to
that effect. 79 Assuming that the Modesto Airport user
agreement was executed in California in the foregoing hy-
pothetical, and assuming that it would be construed under
California law, the airport authority could be precluded
under the agreement from obtaining indemnity for liabil-
ity arising out of its own active negligence.80
To illustrate this point, assume, as an extension of the
above hypothetical, that the airport authority advised the
11 The term "adhesion contract" is generally used to describe a standard form
printed contract prepared by one party and submitted to the other on a "take it or
leave it" basis, where there is frequently no true equality of bargaining power. See
Standard Oil Co. of California v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir. 1965).
A court may refuse to enforce provisions in an adhesion contract if assent was
obtained through unequal bargaining positions of the parties. See M/V American
Queen v. San Diego Marine Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483, 1489 (9th Cir. 1983).
78 Cf M/V American Queen v. San Diego Constr. Corp., 708 F.2d 1483 (9th
Cir. 1983).
-" See, e.g., Armco Steel Corp. v. Roy H. Cox Co., 103 Cal. App. 3d 929, 936,
163 Cal. Rptr. 330, 334 (1980); Rossmoor Sanitation v. Pylon, Inc., 13 Cal. 3d
622, 628, 532 P.2d 97, 100, 119 Cal. Rptr. 449, 452 (1975); MacDonald & Kruse,
Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co., 29 Cal. App. 3d 413, 426, 105 Cal. Rptr. 725, 733
(1972).
" See cases cited at note 78, supra.
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Modesto air traffic controllers that the runway had been
repaired and was ready for use, when, in fact, a substantial
amount of debris and constuction materials had been left
on the runway. While attempting to takeoff, the carrier's
aircraft had to veer off the runway to avoid contact with
the debris and construction materials. The airport au-
thority's negligence in leaving debris on the runway cou-
pled with the affirmative assertion that the runway was
safe for use could probably be characterized as actively
negligent conduct. The absence of any express language
regarding the airport authority's active negligence would
probably preclude its claim for indemnification against
the carrier under California law.8 '
Airport user agreements also frequently require the
carrier to purchase additional insurance to cover its oper-
ations at the airport."2 Often, the airport authority re-
quires that it be named as an additional insured under the
carrier's policy.8 " Such supplemental insurance require-
ments are likely to have an impact upon aviation insurers
in ways similar to those discussed in the context of insur-
ance requirements in interline agreements.8 4
If express indemnity provisions were to be eliminated
from airport user agreements, it is unlikely that airport
operations would be significantly affected. As in the case
of the seller in an individual ground service agreement,
airport authorities would probably rely upon implied in-
demnity to shift the risk, where possible. Where the law
does not support such a shift, the airport authorities
" This hypothetical also illustrates how the lack of uniformity among jurisdic-
tions, as to when an indemnitee may obtain indemnification for its own negligent
acts, can cause the enforceability of an indemnity agreement to hinge on the fo-
rum in which enforcement is sought. For example, although the airport authority
in this hypothetical could not obtain indemnification for its active negligence
under California law, if a New York airport authority were to seek indemnity for
its active negligence under this same agreement, it would likely prevail under New
York law. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
82 For examples of insurance provisions found in airport user agreements, see
Appendix.
- Id.
A4 See supra notes 21-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of interline
agreements.
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themselves would be in a position to purchase additional
insurance to cover their increased liability and pass the
cost of such insurance on to the airlines in the form of
higher user fees.
V. PROPOSED INDEMNITY LANGUAGE
Inartfully drafted contract language frequently contrib-
utes to initiation of costly litigation between all types of
business entities. The aviation industry is not exempt.
Indemnity provisions in interline agreements and airport
user agreements are sometimes not scrutinized carefully
by the parties at the time the contracts are created. Yet,
the precise terms of an indemnity clause can subsequently
become extremely important if one of the parties incurs
liability and seeks indemnification from the other. If the
clause is poorly drafted, settlement of a claim for indem-
nity may be impossible, and litigation may become una-
voidable. Such litigation can disrupt business
relationships in the aviation industry which would other-
wise remain harmonious. More importantly, due to the
lack of uniformity of the laws regarding indemnity in the
various jurisdictions, the ultimate result is largely fortui-
tous, based upon the idiosyncracies of a particular forum.
The actual intent of the parties may be subordinated to
legal technicalities, including disputes over contract inter-
pretation, construction and enforceability.
If a court is called upon to resolve the parties' dispute,
it will almost certainly construe the indemnity clause ac-
cording to the rules applicable to contracts generally.85
The court will attempt to interpret the clause based upon
the intent of the parties. 86 However, ambiguities are
likely to be construed against the indemnitee, particularly
.5 See, e.g., Herman Christensen & Sons v. Paris Plastering Co., 61 Cal. App. 3d
237, 245-46, 132 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (1976).
- See, e.g., Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. V & R Sawmill, Inc., 501 F. Supp.
278, 281 (D.S.D. 1980); Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 493 F. Supp. 1252,
1269 (S.D.W.Va. 1980).
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if the indemnitee drafted the contract.8 7
If express indemnity provisions are to continue to be
incorporated into interline agreements, they should be
carefully drafted so that claims for indemnification may be
resolved quickly and amicably by the parties without the
need for costly and potentially harmful litigation. To this
end, the following model indemnity language is
proposed:
Buyer agrees to indemnify Seller, its officers, directors,
employees and agents against all liability, including but
not limited to attorney's fees, costs and related expenses,
which Seller, its officers, directors, employees or agents
incur arising out of or in connection with the subject mat-
ter of this agreement, regardless of the negligence, active,
passive, or any other type, of Seller, its officers, directors,
employees, or agents, provided, however, that Seller's
right to indemnification from Buyer will not extend to any
liability resulting from the intentional misconduct or ille-
gal act of Seller, its officers, directors, employees or
agents. [Optional Clause] [Buyer retains the right to as-
sume and control the defense of any claim against Seller
for which Buyer agrees to indemnify Seller under the
terms of this Agreement, whenever Buyer determines that
it is in its best interests to control the defense. In the
event Buyer chooses not to assume or control the defense,
Buyer agrees to reimburse Seller for all costs and ex-
penses associated with Seller's defense of the claim in all
instances where Seller is indemnified by Buyer pursuant to
the terms of this Agreement.]"8
The recommended language in this indemnity provision
avoids many of the pitfalls found in indemnification
clauses presently in use. For example, there is no ambi-
quity as to when the seller's right to indemnification
becomes enforceable. The seller is entitled to indemnifi-
8' See supra note 53.
" It should be noted that the proposed indemnity language has been drafted
stylistically to resemble the format of current interline indemnity clauses. The
language can easily be modified for application in airport user agreements and
other aviation-related contracts for indemnification.
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cation only after it has actually incurred liability. In addi-
tion, the seller's right to indemnity extends to all liability
arising out of seller's performance under the agreement,
except liability caused by the seller's intentional miscon-
duct or illegal acts. Consequently, problems surrounding
the definition of imprecise terms such as "gross negli-
gence" and "willful misconduct," and disagreements re-
garding the distinction between "active" and "passive"
negligence will be eliminated.
Utilization of the optional clause mentioned above
might also serve to facilitate cost-effective handling of the
defense of claims arising under interline or airport user
agreements. The initial provision in the optional clause
provides the buyer with the option of controlling the de-
fense of any claim against the seller for which the buyer
concedes that it will indemnify the seller. This promotes a
number of desirable results. First, in a situation where the
buyer knows that it will be obligated to indemnify the
seller in connection with a particular claim, the buyer is
immediately able to step in and control the defense, in
whatever manner seems most propitious. Secondly, and
perhaps more importantly, the buyer's ability immediately
to assume the defense avoids a serious potential conflict
of interest between the buyer and seller. Specifically, in a
situation where the seller is convinced that it will ulti-
mately be indemnified by the buyer, the seller might not
pursue the defense of the claim as aggressively as it would
if it were actually at risk. The optional clause language
allows the parties to avoid this potential conflict of
interest.
The second part of the suggested optional clause can
also serve to promote effective claims handling. If the
buyer chooses not to assume or control the defense of a
claim against the seller, believing perhaps that the seller is
not entitled to indemnification, the seller will nonetheless
be encouraged to actively defend the claim, under the ex-
press terms of the optional clause. Specifically, the clause
states that the seller will be entitled to recover all of its
AIRLINE INDEMNITY
defense costs and related expenses if it is ultimately in-
demnified by the buyer. Accordingly, if the seller is con-
vinced that it will obtain the requested indemnification,
there is little doubt that the seller will be entitled to re-
cover the costs associated with its defense of the claim.
Conversely, if the claim is one which is not ultimately in-
demnified by the buyer, the seller will have been moti-
vated to conduct an agressive defense of the claim, in an
effort to minimize its loss.
VI. CONCLUSION
The magnitude of potential liability in the aviation in-
dustry will increase in proportion to the continued expan-
sion of passenger and cargo transportation. Accordingly,
indemnification is likely to remain an important concern
for air carriers, airport authorities, and aviation insurers
as claims increase. If express indemnity provisions are to
be used to shift the risk of liability, careful scrutiny should
be given to the drafting of such clauses. The language
used should be clear and unambiguous, and sufficient to
withstand legal challenge, so that claims for indemnity
under the agreement may be settled quickly and harmoni-
ously. The use of appropriate language will minimize un-
necessary litigation, and cooperative business relations
will be facilitated. Most importantly, the intent of the par-
ties to shift a particular risk will be embodied in clear and
unequivocal terms, thus satisfying the parties' original
expectations.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains examples of indemnity and in-
surance provisions set forth in airport user agreements by
airport authorities throughout the United States.
I





The Airline shall indemnify and hold harmless the City
against any and all claims of every kind or character grow-
ing out of the negligent acts or omissions of the Airline,
its agents or employees, in the exercise of the rights and
privileges granted to it hereby, whether such claims shall
arise from or be based upon injuries to persons (including
death), or damages to property; provided, the City shall
give the Airline prompt notice of any claim, damage or
loss, or action in respect thereto, and an opportunity rea-
sonably to investigate and defend against any such claim
or action.
INSURANCE
The Airline shall carry public liability insurance with re-
sponsible insurance underwriters having duly designated
agent or agents in Georgia upon whom process in any suit
or action or other proceedings in courts of the State of
Georgia or of the United States may be served, insuring
the Airline against liability for injuries to persons (includ-
ing wrongful death) and damages to property caused by
the Airline's negligent acts or omissions in the exercise of
the rights and privileges granted hereby, or otherwise
caused by the negligence of the Airline in or about the
said runways and taxiways, the policy limits thereof to be
in the amount of not less than Two Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($200,000.00) for any one person and in the
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amount of not less than One Million Dollars
($1,000,000.00) for any one accident involving injury (in-
cluding wrongful death) to more than one person and in
the amount of not less than Two Hundred Thousand Dol-
lars ($200,000.00) for property damage resulting from
any one accident. The Airline shall furnish the City with
certificates of insurance issued by the insurance under-
writers evidencing the existence of valid policies of insur-
ance as aforesaid. Such certificate shall state that the
coverage will not be amended so as to decrease the pro-
tection below the limits specified there or be subject to





AGREEMENT OF LEASE AND USE
INDEMNITY AND INSURANCE
LESSEE shall indemnify and save and hold harmless
CITY from and for any and all losses, claims, actions, or
judgments for damages or injuries to persons or property
and losses and expenses caused by or arising from the use
and occupancy of the exclusive leased premises by
LESSEE, its officers, contractors, agents and employees
and not caused by or arising from the negligence of CITY,
its officers, agents and employees and for LESSEE negli-
gence in the space leased jointly or in common with other
LESSEE. To secure the foregoing Agreement of Indem-
nification, LESSEE shall secure and maintain throughout
the term of this Lease and Use Agreement, public liability
and property damage insurance to which CITY shall be a
named additional insured in accordance with the forego-
ing indemnity provision in a minimum amount not less
than $10,000,000.00 for damage or injuries to persons or
property for any single occurrence or incident. The mini-
mum limit of insurance described above shall not be
deemed a limitation of LESSEE's Agreement to Indem-
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nify and save and hold harmless CITY. A Certificate of







Board and Airline shall each indemnify the other, their
directors, officers, agents and employees, against and
hold the other harmless from all claims and demands by
third persons arising out of damage or injury to persons
(including death) or property, resulting from the tortious
acts or omissions of the indemnifying party or its employ-
ees or resulting from any breach or default by the indem-
nifying party of any of the obligations or duties assumed
by or imposed upon such party by this Agreement.
INSURANCE BY AIRPORT BOARD
(a) Board shall insure or cause to be insured at all times
during the term of this Agreement, with a responsible in-
surance company, companies or carriers authorized and
qualified under the laws of the State of Texas to assume
the risk thereof, to the extent insurable, all of the Board's
buildings, structures, fixtures and equipment on the Air-
port (unless such are insured by others under the terms of
Special Facilities Lease Agreements or other agreements)
against direct physical damage or loss from fire and
against the hazards and risks covered under so-called ex-
tended coverage in an amount not less than ninety per-
cent (90%) of the replacement value of the property so
insured; provided, however, if at any time the Board shall
be unable to obtain such insurance to the extent above
required, Board shall maintain such insurance to the ex-
tent reasonably obtainable.
(b) Additionally, Board shall at all times during the
term of this Agreement maintain reasonably obtainable li-
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ability insurance in amounts reasonably necessary to pro-
tect it from the normal insurable liabilities that may be
incurred in the operations of an airport the size of the Air-
port (except to the extent that such insurance is required
to be carried by sovereign immunity). Said insurance
shall include, to the extent reasonably obtainable, cover-
age of the Board's indemnity obligation under Section 8.5
hereof.
(c) If necessary to comply with Board's extended cover-
age insurance policies, Airline shall conduct reasonable
and appropriate tests of the fire extinguishing system and
apparatus which constitute a part of Airline's Terminal
Structure as reasonably required by Board. Airline shall
notify Board prior to conducting such tests and, if re-
quired by Board's extended coverage policies, shall fur-
nish Board with written reports of such tests.
(d) Airline shall be named an additional insured under
the coverage required in Section 8.1(a) above.
INSURANCE BY AIRLINE
As of the Effective Date and during the balance of this
Agreement, Airline shall maintain reasonably obtainable
liability insurance in amounts reasonably necessary to
protect it from the normal insurable liabilities that may be






AIRPORT TERMINAL BUILDING LEASE
INDEMNITY
Lessee hereby covenants and agrees to indemnify and
hold harmless MAC and keep free and demised premises
and the airport from any mechanic's, tax or other liens
which shall accrue during the term of this lease in connec-
tion with the demised premises or the use thereof by
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Lessee pursuant hereto; and Lessee further covenants and
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless MAC from any
and all liability or claim of liability on account of injury to
person, including death, or destruction or damage to
property occurring on the demised premises and arising
out of the negligent use of the Lessee of the demised
premises or from negligent act or omission of the Lessee
elsewhere on the airport, and to pay any judgment en-
tered against MAC on account of any such injury or dam-
age, and to reimburse MAC for any expense incurred by it
by reason of any claim, account or suit at law or in equity
brought against MAC or in which MAC is made a party,
arising out of the negligent occupancy or use by the
Lessee of the demised premises or arising out of the neg-
ligent act or omission of Lessee elsewhere on the airport,
provided, however, Lessee shall not be liable for injury or
death to person or damage to or loss of property occa-
sioned by negligence of MAC, its employees or agents,
whether separate or concurrent with negligence of others
including Lessee, and, provided further, that no settle-
ment of any claim, action or suit shall be made by MAC
without the written consent of Lessee; and it is further
agreed that MAC will promptly notify Lessee of any mat-
ter covered hereby and shall forward to lessee every de-
mand notice, summons or other process or paper
received in connection with any claim or legal proceeding
covered hereby. For the purpose of this paragraph the
term "expense" shall be construed to include all costs in-
curred by MAC in the defense or settlement of any claim
for which Lessee is required to indemnify MAC hereunder
incurred after refusal of Lessee to undertake the defense
thereof, including attorney's fees, filing fees and salaries
and expenses of any official or employee of MAC while
engaged in the settlement or defense of any such claim,
action or suit.
INSURANCE
Lessee at its cost and expense shall procure and main-
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tain throughout the full term hereof liability insurance in-
suring Lessee and MAC against liability on account of
injury to person, including death, or destruction of or
damage to property to which Lessee is required to indem-
nify MAC under paragraph A next above. Without limit-
ing Lessee's liability to MAC under paragraph A next
above, of this Article VIII, such insurance shall be on a
current basis in the sum not less than One Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($100,000) for injury or death to any
one person and subject to the same limits per person in
an amount of not less than One Million Dollars
($1,000,000.00) for any one accident and in respect to
property damage shall be on an accident basis in a sum of
not less than One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00). Such
insurance shall be written in a company or companies sat-
isfactory to MAC and MAC shall be furnished with evi-
dence through a duplicate copy of such policy or policies
or insurance certificate in the usual form evidencing such
insurance. Policies shall not be subject to cancellation or
termination nor shall coverage limits be reduced below
the specified limits unless MAC shall be given ten days
written notice thereof, and Lessee covenants and agrees
that such insurance shall be maintained throughout the
full term of this lease.
V
SAN ANTONIO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
AIRLINE AIRPORT USE AND LEASE AGREEMENT
INDEMNITY
Airline agrees to indemnify, save, hold harmless, and
defend City, its agents and employees, its successors and
assigns, individually or collectively, from and against all
claims and actions and all expenses incidental to the in-
vestigation and defense thereof, in any way arising out of
or resulting from any acts, omissions or negligence of Air-
line, its agents, employees, licensees, subtenants and as-
signs, in, on or about Airline Premises or upon Airport
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Premises; or in connection with its use and occupancy of
Airline Premises or use of Airport; provided, however,
that Airline shall not be liable for any injury, damage or
loss occasioned by the sole negligence or willful miscon-
duct of the City, its agents or employees. Airline and City
shall give prompt written notice of any such claim or ac-
tion known to it.
Airline shall indemnify, save, hold harmless and defend
City, its agents, and its employees against claims of liabil-
ity arising from or based upon the violation of any Fed-
eral, State, City or Municipal laws, statutes, ordinances, or
regulations by Airline, its agents, employees, licensees or
those under its control.
INSURANCE
Without limiting Airline's obligation to indemnify City,
as provided under Section 10.1 hereof, Airline shall pro-
vide, pay for, and maintain in force at all times during the
term of this Agreement, a policy of comprehensive gen-
eral liability insurance to protect against bodily injury lia-
bility and property damage in an aggregate amount of not
less than $10,000,000.00 per occurrence, a policy of prop-
erty insurance for physical damage to the property of Air-
line, including improvements and betterments to Airline
Premises in an amount representing at least 80% of the
actual cash value of the property, a policy of comprehen-
sive automobile liability insurance in a combined single
limit of not less than $300,000.00, statutory Worker's
Compensation insurance and any other policies of insur-
ance as reasonably required by City. The companies pro-
viding the insurance herein shall be authorized to do
business in the State and to be served notice therein.
The aforesaid insurance amounts and types of insur-
ance shall be reviewed from time to time by City and may
be adjusted by City if City reasonably determines such ad-
justments are necessary to protect City's interest. Airline
shall furnish City no later than ten (10) days following the
execution of this Agreement or prior to commencement
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of any improvements or occupancy by Airline, whichever
shall be earlier, and continuing throughout the term of
this Agreeement hereof a certificate or certificates of in-
surance as evidence that such insurance is in force. City
reserves the right to require a certified copy of such certif-
icates upon request. Airline shall name City as an addi-
tional insured under all required insurance policies. Said
policies shall be in form and content satisfactory to City
and shall provide for thirty (30) days written notice to City
prior to the cancellation of or any material change in such
policy or policies.
VI




District shall not be nor be held liable for any damage
to goods, properties, or effects of Airline or any of Air-
line's representatives, agents, employees, guests, licen-
sees, invitees, or of any other person whatsoever upon the
premises covered by this Permit, nor for personal injuries
to or deaths of them caused by or resulting from Airline's
use or occupancy of the premises covered by this Permit,
or from any defect in any part thereof caused by airline.
Airline agrees to indemnify and save District and its au-
thorized agents, officers, and employees free and harm-
less from any of the foregoing liabilities and any costs and
expenses incurred by District on account of any claim or
claims therefor, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Nothing herein is intended to exculpate District from its
own negligence.
INSURANCE
Airline shall obtain public liability insurance from an in-
surance carrier satisfactory to District to protect against
loss from liability imposed by law for damages on account
of bodily injury, including death resulting therefrom, suf-
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fered or alleged to be suffered by any person or persons
whatsoever resulting directly or indirectly from any act or
activities of Airline or any person acting for it or under its
control or direction, or any person authorized by it to use
the above-described premises, and also to protect against
loss from liabiltiy imposed by law for damage to any prop-
erty of any person caused directly or indirectly by or from
the acts or activities of Airline or any person acting for it
or under its control or direction, or any person authorized
by it to use the above-described premises.
Such public liability and property damage insurance
shall be maintained in full force and effect during the en-
tire term of this Permit in the amount of not less than Ten
Million Dollars ($10,000,000) combined single limit.
Provisions of this paragraph as to maintenance of insur-
ance shall not be construed as limiting in any way the ex-
tent to which Airline may be held responsible for the
payment of damages to persons or property resulting
from its activities or the activities of any person or persons
for which it is otherwise responsible.
Certificates in a form acceptable to District evidencing
the existence of the necessary insurance policies shall be
kept on file with District during the entire term of this
Permit. All insurance policies will name District as an ad-
ditional insured to the extent of the liability assumed by
Airline pursuant to the "Hold Harmless" paragraph
above, protect District against any legal costs in defending
claims and will not terminate without written notice to
District. All insurance companies must be satisfactory to
District and licensed to do business in California.
VII
SAN JOSE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA
SCHEDULED AIRLINE OPERATING AGREEMENT
INDEMNITY
Airline agrees to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless
City from any and all damages, claims, demands, obliga-
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tions, suits, judgments, penalties, causes of action, losses,
or liabilities at any time received, incurred, or accrued by
City as a result of or arising out of the acts, omissions,
use, occupancy, or operations of Airline on, about, or re-
lated to the Airport during the term of this Agreement for
which Airline (but not City) is liable to any person by law.
City agrees to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless
Airline from any and all damages, claims, demands, obli-
gations, suits, judgments, penalties, causes of action,
losses, or liabilities at any time received, incurred or ac-
crued by Airline as a result of or arising out of the acts,
omissions, use, occupancy, or operations of City on,
about, or related to the Airport during the term of this
Agreement for which City (but not Airline) is liable to any
person by law.
As used in this Indemnification paragraph, the refer-
ences to "Airline" and "City" shall include their respec-
tive officers, employees, and agents.
If either of the parties hereto receives a claim, demand,
suit or judgment for which the other party has herein-
above agreed to indemnify it, then the indemnitee shall
promptly notify the indemnitor of such claim, demand,
suit, or judgment, and the indemnitor shall have the right
to investigate, settle, compromise, satisfy, or defend same.
The parties hereto expressly agree that no provision of
this Indemnification paragraph shall in any way limit,
modify, diminish, or otherwise affect the rights, claims,
suits, judgments or causes of action that either party may
at any time have (or have had) against the other party
(whether for contribution, indemnity, or otherwise) aris-
ing out of, resulting from, or related to Airline's noise,
smoke, or vibration.
To the extent that allocation of loss or liability between
the parties hereto is for any reason not covered by the
provisions thereof, the parties agree that the rights of im-
plied indemnity and contribution provided by law shall be
fully applicable to the relationship of the parties under
this Agreement.
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INSURANCE
Airline shall, at its expense, maintain insurance in full
force and effect during the term of this Agreement, which
shall name City, its officers, and employees as additional
insureds and shall be in such amounts as to meet the mini-
mum limits of liability specified below. The insurance
shall be placed with companies or underwriters reason-
ably satisfactory to City. The insurance policy or policies
shall provide not less than that coverage provided by the
standard comprehensive general liability form, with air-
craft exclusions deleted, covering all operations of Airline
and shall include, but not by way of limitation, coverage
for bodily injury including personal injury, property dam-
age, products liabiltiy, and automobile and contractual li-
ability. The policy (or policies) shall contain a cross-
liability or severability-of-interest clause providing that
the inclusion of one insured thereunder shall not affect
the rights of any other insured as respects any claim, de-
mand, suit or judgment made, brought, or recovered by
or in favor of any other insured and providing that the
policy (or policies) shall protect each insured in the same
manner as though a separate policy had been issued to
each insured. Airline shall promptly, after execution of
this Agreement, furnish the City appropriate Certificates
of Insurance evidencing coverage effected in compliance
with the requirements of this Agreement and to be main-
tained for the term of this Agreement. Coverage shall be
no less than $25,000,000.00 Combined Single Limit or at
Airline's sole option not less than (a) $5,000,000.00 with
respect to claims for injury or death to any one person; (b)
$25,000,000.00 with respect to claims for injury or death
to two or more persons in any one occurrence; and (c)
$10,000,000.00 with respect to claims (including conse-
quential loss) for damage or destruction of property.
Coverage shall be subject to periodic review and adjust-
ment by the parties to maintain comparable exposure pro-
tection. The insurance policies shall not be subject to
cancellation or material change except after notice to the
AIRLINE INDEMNITY
City by registered mail at least thirty (30) days prior to the
date of such cancellation or material change. Where any
policy(ies) has (have) normal expiration(s) during the
term of this Agreement, Airline shall provide written evi-
dence of continued coverage prior to such expiration.
The City shall, during the term of this Agreement, pro-
cure and maintain liability and fire and extended coverage
insurance for the Airport, Terminal Buildings, and other
facilities at the Airport in such amounts and for such in-
sured coverages as the City may determine as being rea-
sonably required in the prudent operation of the Airport.
Although the underlying purpose of these provisions is
very similar, i.e., to reduce the airport authority's expo-
sure to liability arising out of a carrier's operations, it is
clear that the language employed to achieve this end var-
ies considerably. The effectiveness of the language se-
lected in shifting the increased risk of liability from the
airport authority to the airline will obviously depend upon
the law of the jurisdiction in which enforcement of the
agreement is sought.
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